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                  IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                  FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
 2
                           Norfolk Division
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       BASF PLANT SCIENCE, LP,
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               Plaintiff,
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        v.
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        COMMONWEALTH SCIENTIFIC AND
        INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH
 8
       ORGANISATION,
 9
               Defendant.
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                                               CIVIL ACTION NO.
                                                     2:17cv503
        COMMONWEALTH SCIENTIFIC AND
        INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH
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        ORGANISATION, GRAINS RESEARCH
12
       AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., AND
       NUSEED PTY LTD.,
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          Plaintiff-Counterclaimants,
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       V.
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       BASF PLANT SCIENCE, LP, and
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       CARGILL, INC.,
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         Defendants-Counterdefendants.
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                        TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
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                          (Jury Trial - Day 16)
2.1
                           Norfolk, Virginia
22
                            November 7, 2019
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     BEFORE: THE HONORABLE HENRY COKE MORGAN, JR.
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              United States District Judge
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Carol L. Naughton, Official Court Reporter

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     APPEARANCES:
 2
                     HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
                     By: Nitya Anand
 3
                          Arlene L. Chow
                          N. Thomas Connally, III
                          Una Chiao-Yi Fan
 4
                          Thomas B. Hunt
                          Takashi Okuda
                          Jared Schubert
 6
                          Anna K. Shaw
                          Ernest Yakob
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 8
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                     Plaintiffs, and Counterclaimants
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                     By:
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18
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                          Daniel R. Gopenko
24
                     Counsel for Cargill, Inc.
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(Proceedings commenced at 3:30 p.m.)
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              THE CLERK: Civil Action No. 2:17cv503, BASF Plant
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     Science, LP, BASF Plant Science GmbH, and Cargill, Inc. v.
     Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation,
 4
 5
     Grains Research and Development Corporation, and Nuseed, PTY
 6
     LTD.
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              For BASF and Cargill, Ms. Shaw, Mr. Connally, are
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     you ready to proceed?
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              MR. CONNALLY: We are.
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              THE CLERK: For CSIRO, GRDC, and Nuseed, Mr. Zaheer,
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     Ms. Jones, and Mr. Sung, are you ready to proceed?
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              MR. ZAHEER: We are, Your Honor. Thank you.
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              THE COURT: Well, the Court, of necessity, had to
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     pick a time when negotiations had to cease, if they were not
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     going to make any progress. It appears to the Court, from
     the proponents' filing, that they, at least, weren't
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     interested in making any progress, so I assume that none has
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     been made.
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              MR. ZAHEER: Your Honor, the parties met yesterday
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     and this morning, and we were unable to reach --
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              THE COURT: What?
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              MR. ZAHEER: The parties met yesterday and this
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     morning, and we were unable to reach common ground with
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     respect to a royalty rate.
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              THE COURT: Well, the document you filed this
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morning said you didn't want any relief, you wanted the Court
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     to decide to award no relief. That doesn't sound like there
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     was much negotiating going on.
              MR. ZAHEER: We were able to negotiate. Again, we
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     tried to -- tried our best to reach a resolution, but we were
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     unable to do so.
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              THE COURT: Do the parties think any additional time
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     would be fruitful?
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              MR. CONNALLY: I do not, Your Honor.
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              MR. ZAHEER: No, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: All right. Well, I must say it was
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     unusual to get the request we got from the proponents this
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    morning. It sounds like you just want to have another trial
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     in another court.
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              MR. ZAHEER: I'm happy to address that, Your Honor,
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     if you'd like me to.
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              THE COURT: I don't think it would be fruitful.
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              Well, as I said, the Fourth Circuit has strongly
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     suggested that before the Court attempts to reach a royalty
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     decision, that it give the parties an opportunity to
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     negotiate, which we've done. And both parties have now told
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     the Court that they didn't think any further negotiations
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     would be helpful, so the Court will proceed with what it
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     previously indicated its ruling was, which is to determine an
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     ongoing royalty.
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I can only say it never occurred to me that I'd be getting a brief asking for the Court to make a finding of no action. But I don't think that's appropriate, and, in fact, I think that just runs exactly contrary to what the Court requested that the parties do. I suppose it would have been reasonable to make that request before the Court made its findings on which way we would proceed, but to make that request in the middle of what is supposed to be negotiations is not at all persuasive to the Court.

The Court has to look at all of the factors that should go into determining what a reasonable royalty should be and whether that reasonable royalty should be made up of ongoing royalty or a lump sum or both. I think the most efficient way to review the factors is to go through the Georgia-Pacific factors. A number of the factors the Court has considered follow the Georgia-Pacific factors, but there are other factors the Court has considered, as well.

As the Court indicated, it did not find the comparables cited by the plaintiffs' expert to be appropriate comparables, nor did the Court believe that the mathematical and economic assumptions from those two negotiations — that is, the contract between Nuseed and GRDC and CSIRO or the consultations between BASF and Cargill — were comparables, and so the Court ruled out the 12 to 49 percent running royalty put forth by the plaintiffs' expert, as well as

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the -- by "the plaintiffs'," I should say "proponents'" -- as well as the revised mathematical economic viewpoint based on those comparables by the opponents' expert.
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The comparables used by the opponents' expert are reasonable, but, as the Court said, they're not ideal, because they don't deal with negotiations between competitors, which would be the best guide for the Court to look to. But they do have some value; although the Court is not adopting the numbers put forth by the opponents' expert, either.

So applying that reasoning to factors 1 and 2 of the Georgia-Pacific factors, they simply are not sufficiently comparable to base a ruling entirely on them, and, therefore, factors 1 and 2 are not considered by the Court as highly favorable or unfavorable to either party.

Georgia-Pacific factor number 2 weighs in favor of reducing the royalty because the royalty would be nonexclusive and, therefore, would encourage a reduction in the royalty. However, it appeared to the Court that, given the evidence in the case, which indicates the extensive research and development necessary, together with the regulatory approvals necessary in the food product, make the probability of another licensing agreement being available to the proponents of little value.

Georgia-Pacific number 4 also would argue in favor

of a lesser royalty, as it indicates that recently there were still negotiations going on. And when I say "recently," I'm talking about in 2016 there were negotiations going on between the parties to obtain a license, and when those negotiations broke down, the suit was filed. But that indicates that the proponents were willing to license their property interest in the patents, but it does not appear from the evidence that that was their preference. They wanted somebody who would be more of a partner with them in marketing the product than just granting a license. So that factor does not carry much weight.

Georgia-Pacific factor number 5 calls for an upward influence because the proposed licensee has been found to be an infringer, and, arguably -- although the evidence is not clear on this -- they would be competitors in the market, along with all the sales of the fish oil. The market, as portrayed in the exhibits of the parties, includes not only the parties to this action but also all the competing parties in selling fish oil. So it's not a two-party market, it's a multiparty market.

Nonetheless, the fact that the opponents have been found to be an infringer and, indeed, admitted infringement on most of the patents asserted is a significant upward factor for the Court to consider in determining the proper number.

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Factor number 6 is would the sale of the product enhance the sale of other products? I don't see that it would, except it could enhance the sale of the product intended for human consumption. But neither party has obtained permission to sell that product at this point, so that's not a significant factor.

Factor number 7 -- and we talked about that before -- is the duration of the patent, which is short. So, again, the downward influence of this is negated by the time factor involved in producing a patentable food product, whether it's for human or fish consumption.

Factor 8 comes into play because the opponents -- or "something closely related to factor 8" may be more accurate to say -- comes into play because the opponents' expert referred to the additional technology obtained by the opponent in its negotiation with the three schools. However, it does not appear that whatever extra technology that they obtain -- there's no evidence to indicate that it has any significant value, so what would otherwise be a downward variance would be minimized by that factor.

And the potential profitability of the property is, again, difficult to determine based on the projections of both parties, as well as their testimony about how difficult it is to make such a projection.

Another upward factor is that the product is unique;

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although the opponents have been working for many years on developing their own product and, in fact, were awarded a patent. That goes toward one of the factors in the liability phase directly; it shows that there was competition for developing the product.

Opponents' patent doesn't really have any import in the consideration of the *Georgia-Pacific* factors on damages, however. Probably, over time, the products which are the subject of the infringement will continue to improve. It will probably cost less to create them, and as they improve, they will be more competitive with the fish-based products, so that is a factor in favor of increasing the royalties.

Factor 11 is also in favor of a slightly upward influence, because Cargill has — although they've not sold any product, they're close to it. It does not appear that the plaintiff, however, is close to it. The deposition testimony of Ms. Boettner, which was read into the case, indicates remarkably little progress in bringing the proponents' product to market. And the only thing that's happened between her testimony from September 9th and her testimony at trial is that she's gotten a new title and hired one employee, so that does not have much influence.

Factor 12 is the customary profit in similar products. We don't know what the customary profit is in similar products since the similar products are the fish oil.

We have had testimony about the cost of fish oil, but we have had absolutely no testimony of what profit you make from selling the fish oil.

The risk as compared with the profit, under item 13, also remains undetermined. Both parties have made projections, and both parties have invested considerable funds in developing their respective products, but, again, there's been little evidence of -- there's been some evidence of the cost of the infringing products but no evidence of the cost of the proponents' products which has been represented as being in competition with the defendant, so that factor is not significant.

Factor 14 is opinion testimony. The Court found the testimony of the opponents' expert far more objective and credible than that of the proponents' expert on all of the -- not only the royalty, but the other factors affecting the granting of an injunction, so that factor would favor a downward adjustment.

However, the problem is that two of the downward adjustments were not explained by the opponents' expert. I did examine him myself on one of the elements, which is the short time remaining on the patent, and he conceded that that was not an important element. But although the opponents' expert said that he considered the upward adjusting elements and the downward adjusting elements, he didn't explain

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exactly how he considered them. He ended up with a number which was based solely on the adjusted cost of what I believe they paid the University of Hamburg, adjusted for inflation. So the Court cannot make any determination whether he just offset the upward and downward adjustments and came out even, or exactly how he treated these upward and downward adjustments. He didn't explain it.

The Court finds that examining all the factors, including the *Georgia-Pacific* factors, there's more persuasive evidence to support the upward factors than the downward factors. The question is how do you monetize that? That's the difficult part, which I had hoped the parties would resolve through negotiations, but since they were unable to do so, the Court will do it.

One of the factors that's very important to the negotiations is that the Court found that the evidence did not justify the granting of an injunction, for a variety of reasons; principal among which was the failure of the proponents to establish any degree of public interest in favor of the granting of injunction, but there were others as well.

I think that there should be an upward adjustment of the lump sum payment. I think it should be tripled. I think there should also be an upward adjustment of the 1.4 percent royalty, which the Court has increased by a factor of 2.5,

which would make the adjusted running figure 3.5 percent.

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I haven't done the math on that, but I think we're talking -- I think tripling the -- I think it was like 1.2-something million. So the Court feels that that number, whatever it was suggested by Mr. Napper, should be tripled. I think it should be doubled because the Court doesn't know to what extent he considered the upward factors, and I think it should be increased by another factor because he spoke of downward factors, which the Court feels were not -- may have been considered by him, but the Court doesn't consider them of any particular value -- or of minimal value, I would say.

So they're the numbers that the court will incorporate into its finding.

The Court has already advised counsel of some of the findings of fact it's going to make; however, I haven't completed the findings of fact or conclusions of law beyond which I stated before the negotiations and have restated, in part, here today, so the Court is in the process of preparing a written opinion on all the issues that have come before it in the course of the trial, and we'll try to have that out as soon as possible.

However, the Court's finding of the form of the damages awarded and the Court's determination of the amount of the running royalty and the lump sum payment are findings that will be effective immediately.

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Does counsel have any matter it would like to bring
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     to the attention of the Court at this time?
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              MR. ZAHEER: Yes, Your Honor. I don't think the
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     Court addressed the '541 patent.
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              THE COURT:
                          What?
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              MR. ZAHEER: I don't think Your Honor addressed the
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     '541 patent.
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              THE COURT:
                          I intentionally didn't address the '541
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     patent. There doesn't seem to be any infringing activity
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     with respect to the '541 patent at this time, according to
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     the evidence, but nonetheless, that patent was found to be
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     infringed, and the proponent is entitled to some form of
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     damages or protection of that patent. But I've been focusing
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     my attention on trying to come up with what I thought would
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     be an appropriate royalty, as opposed to dealing with other
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     issues, and that's what all of us have been focused on.
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     we just haven't figured out what the proper form of damages
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     would be for the '541 patent, but the proponent is definitely
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     entitled to some sort of protection of that patent.
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              Anything else from the proponents?
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              MR. ZAHEER: Nothing further, Your Honor.
22
     you.
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              THE COURT: Anything from the opponents?
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              MR. CONNALLY: No, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: All right. As I say, the Court's
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findings of the form of the damages and the amount of damages
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     are effective immediately, but I will prepare a written
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     opinion explaining the number of issues that have arisen
     during the trial. All I can say is we'll get it done as soon
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     as we can. I'm not sure exactly how long it's going to take.
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     There are a lot of rulings, a lot of issues.
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              If there's nothing further, then we'll be adjourned.
              (Proceedings adjourned at 4:05 p.m.)
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                             CERTIFICATION
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12
          I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript
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     from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
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15
                            /s/____
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17
                           Carol L. Naughton
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                           November 7, 2019
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